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Introduction
To what extent can the phenomenon of trust be accurately understood in the 
context of an isolated interpersonal relationship? Certainly, trust as a social judg-
ment about the willingness to be vulnerable to the decisions and actions of 
another is shaped by our direct experiences with a focal individual. Yet, trust is 
also based on what we learn about a person indirectly through our interactions 
with others who have also had experiences with the same person and on the 
surrounding conditions that affect the social dynamics of trust. In the context 
of organizations, which consist of a web of formal and informal interactions for 
coordinating efforts, exchanging information, and making decisions (McEvily, 
Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003; McEvily, Soda, & Tortoriello, 2014; Puranam, 2018; 
Soda & Zaheer, 2012), an isolated interpersonal relationship would appear to be 
more of an anomaly than the norm. If correct, we see this as quite striking given 
that the bulk of organizational research on trust, and dominant models of trust 
(e.g., Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; McAllister, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, 
& Camerer, 1998), focus exclusively on trust between a specific trustor and trustee 
who interact directly, while overlooking the influence of the broader network of 
interactions surrounding a trust dyad (De Jong, Kroon & Schilke, 2017). Indeed, 
we know of only a handful of empirical studies examining networks and trust 
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(e.g., Burt & Knez, 1995; Buskens, 1998; Chua, Ingram, & Morris, 2008; Ferrin, 
Dirks, & Shah, 2006; Gulati, 1995a and 1995b; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Lau & Liden, 
2008; Shazi, Gillespie, & Steen, 2015). Similarly, the chapter by Jones and Shah in 
this volume is one of the few theoretical treatments of interpersonal trust from a 
network perspective of which we are aware. While these initial contributions have 
both confirmed the enhanced explanatory power and clarified the underlying 
conceptual mechanisms of networks in models of relational trust (e.g., McAllister, 
1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998), the organizational literature has 
yet to consider the extent to which trust extends beyond dyads.
We argue that a pervasive form of trust occurs among individuals who are not 
necessarily directly connected. Specifically, we introduce the concept of network trust, 
which we maintain is distinct in terms of its locus of operation, antecedents, and out-
comes relative to established forms of trust (e.g., relational, presumptive, swift, insti-
tutional, generalized). Central to our notion of network trust is the idea that apart 
from forming as a result of direct interaction, trust also flows through the indirect con-
nections linking individuals to one another and emerges from the inherent design 
features of the network itself. In this way, network trust is a multilevel phenomenon 
involving system-level (i.e., network-level) features that condition individual-level 
actions, which in turn aggregate to produce system-level outcomes (Coleman, 1990). 
To better illuminate our notion of network trust, we begin with some examples.
The case of the tenure letter: take the situation of a letter of recommendation for 
a tenure candidate, Beth (see Figure 8.1). Lisa is Beth’s senior colleague chairing 
the tenure review committee. Bob is a letter-writer for Beth. Some of the letters 
for Beth’s case, including Bob’s, were controversial. Lisa decided to gather some 
additional information about the significance of Beth’s scholarly impact to help 
the committee better interpret Bob’s letter, so she reached out to her colleague 
Don for help, who was a co-author of Bob’s. In turn, Don asked Bob for some 
insights and Bob duly obliged. Don relayed the information to Lisa who then 
passed it on to the committee to inform their deliberations. Even though Lisa 
and Bob never interacted directly and do not know each other, Lisa trusted the 




Arrows indicate direction of trust
Solid line arrow = relational trust (direct tie)
Dashed line arrow = secondhand trust (indirect tie)
Bob
FIGURE 8.1  Secondhand trust with two degrees of separation.
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Bob. While it is possible that as a result of the transmission of information, Lisa 
and Bob initiate a direct relationship, it is not required for trust to function.
The case of the alumni association: Avi is an alumnus of a leading MBA program. 
At a professional development event organized by the school, Avi met Barb. Even 
though Barb graduated four years earlier than Avi and did not have any acquaint-
ances in common, when Avi described his start-up venture aimed at placing arti-
sanal products from India at upscale retailers, Barb offered to introduce Avi to her 
classmate Claire, who was a senior manager at a luxury department store. When 
Barb contacted Claire she immediately agreed to the introduction and met with 
Avi the following week. Despite Barb and Avi being strangers, by virtue of their 
common affiliation to the school, Barb was comfortable referring Avi to Claire.
The case of social trading: eToro is an open platform for online trading of curren-
cies, stocks, and commodities. Joining the platform is free and requires a nominal 
deposit of funds to invest. All the traders on the site are visible to everyone, and all 
traders’ investments, transactions, and portfolios are fully transparent. More impor-
tantly, for each trader, their daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly financial perfor-
mance, as well as their portfolio’s risk and volatility, is accessible to all. In addition, 
the platform allows traders to communicate with one another, but only through 
public posts that everyone can view. Traders can initiate trades on their own, but 
also choose to ‘copy trade’ the actions of another trader. To do so, a trader decides 
the percentage of their funds that they want to allocate to each ‘copied’ trader. The 
site then automatically executes all subsequent transactions by the copied trader 
on the copying trader’s account. Copy-trading activity is public and the top 100 
highly copied traders are prominently displayed on the platform. Interestingly, in 
making copy choices traders place more emphasis on the status and social visibil-
ity than the financial performance of other traders.
Stepping back from these examples, we make two observations about forms 
of trust that do not clearly conform to the concept of relational trust. First, we 
see trust occurring in instances between a trustor and trustee who do not have a 
direct relationship. In the case of the tenure letter, Lisa’s reliance on Bob’s private 
information is based on Don serving as a proxy for Lisa’s trust in Bob as opposed 
to her trust in Bob directly. Likewise, in the case of the alumni association, Claire’s 
willingness to spend time hearing a pitch for new products is based on Barb serv-
ing as a proxy for Claire’s trust in Avi. The case of the alumni association and the 
case of the social trading platform also illustrate the propensity for individuals 
to make themselves vulnerable to the actions and decisions of others based on a 
premise of trust rather than any personal knowledge of, or experience with, those 
strangers (e.g., Barb’s referral of Avi and traders copying other traders). Second, 
these two forms of trust occur within the bounds of a network. Thus, in each of 
the examples trust is not simply a dyadic element, but instead is situated in the 
larger social space connecting individuals as well as in the shared affiliation to a 
collective entity (see also Gunia, 2019 for related treatments in negotiations). We 
maintain that existing conceptualizations do not adequately capture these forms 
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of trust and we propose that the examples above, as well as other similar instances, 
fall into a class of trust that we refer to as network trust.
In this chapter, we aim to move beyond the extensive focus on relational trust 
in the organizational literature by broadening the conceptualization of trust to 
include its inherent generalizability across a network. In doing so, we aim to 
broaden the scope of organizational scholarship on trust in order to more fully 
realize the potential of the intuition that social resources extend beyond dyads and 
to advance the view that it is not exclusively through direct relationships that the 
benefits of trust accrue and are realized. That is, trust exists and matters at the level 
of not only direct relationships, but also indirect connections across, and even lack 
of connection among members of, a network.
In the remainder of this chapter, we define network trust and identify two 
separate forms that it takes: secondhand trust and prototrust. We then ground our def-
inition in core concepts from network theory (reputation, status, and social con-
trol) and subsequently proceed to identify the logics (mechanisms, indicators, and 
contingencies) of the two forms of network trust. Next, we detail the effects of 
network trust, followed by a discussion of how network trust is distinct from and 
related to other trust constructs (e.g., relational, presumptive, swift, institutional, 
generalized). We conclude by exploring how the two forms of network trust can 
enrich the organizational literature and pave the way for fresh lines of inquiry.
Network Trust Defined
We define network trust as generalized positive expectations about the motives, 
intentions, and behavior between actors who are not directly connected to each 
other but are part of a bounded social structure (i.e., the set of formal or informal 
relations among actors). As opposed to particularized forms of trust (e.g., rela-
tional) that are directed at a specific target, network trust is less focused on a single 
actor and at times extends to multiple members of a bounded social structure. At 
the same time, our conceptualization of network trust does not encompass the 
entire network as its point of reference for categorizing whether the members 
of the network trust one another overall (Gausdal, Svare, & Möllering, 2016). 
Rather, our notion of network trust resides between the dyadic and network lev-
els as a feature of the social structure within which members are embedded. For 
the purposes of network trust, it is critical that members of the bounded social 
system generally agree upon and recognize themselves as part of that system.
Network research points to two approaches to defining the boundary of a social 
system. The boundary can be defined from the vantage point of the actors them-
selves, or from the perspective of researchers imposing a boundary constructed 
to serve a particular analytical or conceptual objective (Laumann, Marsden, & 
Prensky, 1989). For our purposes, the critical issue is that the members of the social 
system widely agree on the boundary, such as when they recognize themselves as 
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members, identify with each other on the basis of shared characteristics, or accept 
the categorization applied to themselves as meaningful. In this sense, we hew 
closer to the actor-defined view of defining network boundaries.
We conceptualize network trust as comprised of two forms: second-hand trust 
and prototrust. Secondhand trust refers to the partial spillover of relational trust to 
socially proximate, indirectly connected actors (e.g., the case of the tenure letter 
and the case of alumni association), to the nth degree of separation, albeit with 
decay. The notion of Simmelian (1950) ties – a strong, reciprocal relationship that 
is supported by a common third party – is apropos in that trust in a common 
third party serves as a proxy for the disconnected actors’ trust in each other. Trust 
in the third party substitutes for relational trust between the disconnected actors 
as with, for example, referrals. As Granovetter (1985, p. 490) explained, “Better 
than the statement that someone is known to be reliable is information from a 
trusted informant that he has dealt with that individual and found him so.” By pro-
totrust we mean the latent potential for confident positive expectations to emerge 
between two actors who are neither directly nor indirectly connected (e.g., in 
the case of the alumni association, Barb’s referral of Avi after meeting him for the 
first time, and in the case of eToro traders, copying other traders who are stran-
gers). Prototrust enables the members of a bounded social system to activate trust. 
Prototrust is not trust per se, but rather refers to the conditions giving rise to the 
emergence of confident positive expectations between any two actors in a net-
work, although it may or may not evolve into relational trust. Even if prototrust 
does not evolve into relational trust, it still allows two actors to make themselves 
vulnerable to one another (see Table 8.1). 
TABLE 8.1  Relational trust and network trust definitions
Form of trust Definition Example
Relational trust Trustor’s positive expectations about the 
trustee’s intentions based on information 
from within their direct relationship
The case of the tenure 




Generalized positive expectations about 
the motives, intentions, and behaviors 
between actors who are not directly 
connected to each other, but are indirectly 
connected in a bounded social structure
The case of the tenure 
letter: Lisa trusts Bob 
(Figure 8.1)





Generalized positive expectations about 
the motives, intentions, and behaviors 
between actors who are neither directly nor 
indirectly connected to each other in a 
bounded social structure
The case of the alumni 
association: Barb 
trusts Avi
The case of the social 
trading platform: 
eToro 
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Network Theory and Trust
Whereas trust in the organizational literature is most commonly conceptualized 
in the context of an isolated individual dyad, network theory considers the rela-
tionships among interconnected sets of dyads, with triads being the most basic 
unit of analysis, and extending to larger and more complex configurations, com-
monly referred to as social structure. A distinguishing feature of network theory 
relative to other theories of organization is its focus on discretionary relationships, 
as opposed to those that are formally mandated or assigned by the organization. 
More specifically, network theory differs from other theories of organization in 
that the system of discretionary relationships describes and defines social space as a 
way of differentiating actors both horizontally, in terms of proximity and the flow 
of valued resources, and vertically, in terms of status and prestige.
By horizontal network differentiation we mean the heterogeneity in locations, 
or positions, occupied by individual actors that defines their access to valued 
resources flowing through the network. Thus, networks serve as critical chan-
nels. Chief among network resources is information, particularly private infor-
mation, that is not equally accessible to all. Private information flowing through 
networks includes, but is not limited to: factual knowledge, gossip, second-hand 
stories, half-truths, distorted facts, and outright lies (Burt & Knez, 1995). Since 
networks “penetrate irregularly and in differing degrees” (Granovetter, 1985, p. 
491), different people hear about, learn about, understand, and believe different 
things, even polar opposite things, about the same individual. In this respect, what 
people ‘know’ about a person, i.e., the reputation of the person, can and does vary 
from complete ignorance to deep insight and, critically, informs the strength and 
types of social judgments they form, and therefore the very meaning, degree, and 
valence of trust (or distrust). From a network perspective, therefore, one can see 
the value of conceptualizing trust in terms of impressions shaped based on private 
information acquired through indirect channels.
Vertical network differentiation, on the other hand, implies heterogeneity in the 
respect, or status, ascribed to individual actors. When actors are sorted into social 
positions that carry unequal rewards, obligations, and expectations, a status hierarchy 
is established. Status refers to the prestige, esteem, and admiration actors enjoy from 
others (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006). Status is based on 
both innate attributes, reflecting underlying variations in actors’ qualities, and on 
social judgments that confer privileged positions to actors in a way that is largely 
independent of their innate qualities. Such judgments are particularly salient under 
conditions of uncertainty (Podolny, 1993). For our purposes, status is a combination 
of both innate quality and social judgments. As Gould (2002, p. 1146) argues, 
the reason positions with greater and lesser advantage exist is that judgments 
about relative quality are socially influenced. Socially influenced judgments 
amplify underlying differences, so that actors who objectively rank above 
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the mean on some abstract quality dimension are over-valued while those 
ranking below the mean are undervalued – relative to the baseline scenario, 
in which social influence does not operate. Amplification occurs because 
observable interactions expressing judgments of quality are also cues to 
other actors seeking guidance for their own judgments. 
From a network perspective, status is related to trust in two ways. First, high-
status actors are trusted when their innate qualities or the social judgments about 
those actors are reflective of their ability, benevolence, and integrity. Second, those 
judgments are further reinforced as members of a network model their own judg-
ments on those of other network members. Thus, status serves as a proxy for trust 
when social judgments about an actor’s intentions and motives ripple through a 
network.
Network theory differs from other theories of organization not only with 
respect to how it differentiates actors horizontally and vertically in a bounded sys-
tem of discretionary relationships but also in terms of how it defines and describes 
the governance of such social systems. In networks, governance (i.e., the frame-
work of agreed-upon rules of organization) is emergent, collective, and based on 
social control as opposed to being mandated and based on formal authority. For 
instance, actors self-select into joining and opting out of networks, and by the 
same token, members are accepted into, and can be expelled by the members and 
or organizers of, a network. Likewise, members of a network often internalize 
the norms, expectations, and codes of conduct to the extent they share a social 
identity (Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 1998) with other members. From a network 
perspective, there are no legally binding contracts detailing performance duties 
and obligations, nor is there hierarchical fiat that serves as the ultimate arbiter of 
divergent preferences and priorities. Instead, order in the context of networks is a 
matter of socially defined, constructed, and maintained understandings.
Taken together, network theory offers a distinctive lens through which trust 
can be understood. Most important is the idea that trust is able to operate in 
the absence of a direct relationship between a trustor and trustee by virtue of 
the bounded system of discretionary relationships that differentiates actors both 
horizontally (in terms of reputation) and vertically (in terms of status), as well 
as the framework of governance (in terms of social control). Using the network 
mechanisms of reputation, status, and social control, we now explain the logic of 
secondhand trust and prototrust.
Logics of Network Trust
Secondhand Trust
As noted previously, we define secondhand trust as trust between two actors who 
are not directly connected but are socially proximate to each other. Secondhand 
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trust is based on (one or more) intermediate third parties acting as proxies for 
trust between two disconnected actors. Third parties who broker trust in this way 
occupy the role of a trust “advisor” (Coleman, 1990; McEvily et al., 2003). More 
specifically, the two disconnected actors both have a relationship of mutual trust 
with the advisor. Returning to the case of the tenure letter, secondhand trust 
exists between Lisa and Bob, who are not directly connected to each other. Lisa 
trusts the information provided by Bob because she has a relational trust tie with 
Don and, in turn, Don has one with Bob. Thus, Don is not only a direct connec-
tion to Lisa, but also an indirect channel to Bob through which private informa-
tion flows. The private information includes both the veracity, or reputation, of 
Bob and the details about Beth that Bob divulges. Critically, it is relationships of 
mutual, as opposed to unidirectional, relational trust with the advisor that under-
gird secondhand trust. Clearly, Lisa is vulnerable to misinformation from Don, as 
is Don from Bob. Yet, Bob is also vulnerable to Don mishandling sensitive infor-
mation, as is Don to Lisa. Thus, for secondhand trust to function the advisor needs 
to be trusted by, and trust, both the trustor and trustee.
Drawing on and extending the network bases of trust (McEvily et al., 2003), 
we now articulate the mechanisms, indicators, and contingencies of secondhand 
trust (see Table 8.2). As we explain in detail below, secondhand trust is based on 
the mechanism of transitivity. The primary network indicator for secondhand 
trust is the open triad. Key contingencies of secondhand trust include tie strength, 
social distance, and network closure.
Mechanism
Relational trust gives rise to the potential for secondhand trust to emerge through 
the network process of transitivity. Formally, transitivity refers to a system of rela-
tionships among all three actors in a triad (Simmel, 1950; Granovetter, 1973; 
Krackhardt, 1999). When a focal actor (Don), who is strongly connected to two 
other actors (Lisa and Bob), facilitates a connection between those two actors, 
TABLE 8.2  Logics of network trust
Form of network trust Mechanisms Indicators Contingencies
Secondhand trust Transitivity Open triad Tie strength
Social distance
Network closure
Prototrust Social prospecting (Dis)assortativity Governance veracity
- Interest-based Network closure
- Status-based Identity authenticity
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transitivity occurs (Aven, 2015). In the context of secondhand trust, transitivity 
occurs when the relational trust between Don and Lisa, and between Don and 
Bob, is generative of a secondhand trust tie between Lisa and Bob. Note that 
the secondhand trust tie between Lisa and Bob is of a different kind than those 
between Lisa and Don and between Don and Bob. Rather than a relationship of 
direct mutual trust with each other, Lisa and Bob have an indirect, secondhand 
tie to one another through Don. The secondhand tie has the latent potential to 
evolve into a direct relationship between Lisa and Bob,1 although that is not nec-
essary for secondhand trust to occur.
Indicators
Secondhand trust is most directly observable in a system of triadic relationships; 
specifically, an ‘open’ triad (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992) in which two of the 
actors are not directly connected to each other, but are connected to the same 
advisor with reciprocal trust ties.2 For instance, in Figure 8.1, the Lisa–Don–Bob 
triad is open in the sense that Lisa and Bob are only indirectly connected through 
Don. The structural configuration of an open triad by itself is necessary, but not 
sufficient to capture secondhand trust. In addition, the conditions giving rise to 
the need for trust – i.e., risk and interdependence (Rousseau et al., 1998) – are 
also required. Risk is inherent in the structural configuration. Interdependence, 
however, is likely to vary across open triads and needs to be activated by one or 
both of the disconnected parties. Secondhand trust may also be observable in 
open systems of relationships beyond triads, such as quads and larger.
Contingencies
The incidence and intensity of secondhand trust are amplified (or diminished) 
by features of the first-order ties (e.g., between Lisa and Don, and Don and Bob) 
and the configuration of the network surrounding the secondhand trust triad (i.e., 
trustor, trustee, and advisor). Not all first-order ties and network configurations 
are equally potent in enabling secondhand trust.
Tie strength. First-order tie strength – comprised of the frequency and dura-
tion of interaction, expressiveness, and reciprocation (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008; 
Granovetter, 1973; Krackhardt, 1990) – will act as a catalyst (Tortoriello, McEvily, 
1  We note that the formation of such a direct relational trust tie is consistent with the core prediction 
of structural balance theory, whereby actors are motivated to eliminate strain or tension resulting 
from a triadic system of relationships of inconsistent valence (Cartwright & Harary, 1956; Heider, 
1946, 1958; Hummon & Doreian, 2003).
2  For a triad to serve as an indicator of secondhand trust, both the secondhand trustor (Lisa in 
Figure 8.1) and the secondhand trustee (Bob) need to have positive and reciprocal relations of trust 
with the advisor (Don).
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& Krackhardt, 2015) for secondhand trust. The stronger the trust in the first-order 
ties, the greater the confidence in and willingness to rely on the judgment of the 
trust advisor (Don). When both first-order ties are strong, the potential for sec-
ondhand trust is the greatest. However, if one first-order tie is weak, the stronger 
tie may compensate up to a point, but only to a limited degree and secondhand 
trust is less likely. Thus, secondhand trust is not simply a multiplicative function of 
first-order tie strength.
Social distance. The logic of secondhand trust extends beyond two degrees of 
separation, e.g., beyond a friend of a friend (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). We believe, 
however, that secondhand trust will decay rapidly with increasing social distance 
in terms of the number of intermediaries on the shortest path between a poten-
tial trustor and trustee. As the number of intermediaries increases, the trustor and 
trustee increasingly rely on actors to whom one or both are not directly con-
nected. For instance, as shown in Figure 8.2, if only Lisa is directly connected 
to Don and Bob is only directly connected to Deb, who in turn is directly con-
nected to Don, Lisa and Bob are now three degrees of separation from each other 
as opposed to the two degrees separating Lisa and Bob in Figure 8.1. As a result, 
Don is able to vouch for Lisa and Deb, but not Bob, while Deb is able to vouch 
for Bob and Don, but not Lisa. Thus, neither trust advisor (Don and Deb) is able 
to vouch for both the secondhand trustor (Lisa) and secondhand trustee (Bob). 
Even so, both the trustor and trustee have direct relationships with one of the two 
trust brokers, which is why there continues to be the potential for secondhand 
trust. Further extending secondhand trust to four degrees of separation, involving 
three trust advisors (e.g., Don to Dan to Deb in Figure 8.3), one of whom (Dan) 
neither the secondhand trustor nor secondhand trustee is directly connected to, 
further diminishes the prospects for secondhand trust due to the limited veracity 
of information accessed and the heightened risks of the trustor and trustee relying 
on the referral of a stranger. That is, Dan is able to vouch for neither Lisa nor Bob 






Arrows indicate direction of trust
Solid line arrow = relational trust (direct tie)
Dashed line arrow = secondhand trust (indirect tie)
FIGURE 8.2  Secondhand trust with three degrees of separation.
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Network closure. The occurrence of secondhand trust also depends on the extent 
to which there is network closure around a trust triad. Network closure exists 
when the members of a secondhand trust triad have mutual connections to com-
mon third parties outside the triad (Coleman, 1988; Burt, 2005). For instance, 
if Lisa, Don, and Bob are all connected to Tim as shown in Figure 8.4, Tim is a 
common third party to all three individuals and there is complete closure around 
the secondhand trust triad. In networks characterized by closure, information 
circulates rapidly and is relatively easy to calibrate and confirm. As a result, indi-
viduals are more likely to have common knowledge and shared understandings 
in closed relative to open networks (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). More critically, 
closed networks permit a more robust form of social control than open networks 
by sanctioning anti-social behavior and rewarding pro-social behavior (Coleman, 
1990). Moreover, in closed networks, news of actors’ pro- and anti-social behav-
ior (e.g., sharing versus withholding requested information, clarifying versus dis-
torting sensitive details, etc.) also circulates rapidly and as a result, magnifies the 
reputational consequences of one’s behavior (Burt & Knez, 1995). Whereas in 






Arrows indicate direction of trust
Solid line arrow = relational trust (direct tie)
Dashed line arrow = secondhand trust (indirect tie)






Arrows indicate direction of trust
Solid line arrow = relational trust (direct tie)
Dashed line arrow = secondhand trust (indirect tie)
FIGURE 8.4  Secondhand trust with network closure.
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the relationship, in a closed network, one’s reputation in the eyes of mutual third 
parties is also altered. Given this, actors tend more toward pro- rather than anti-
social behavior in closed networks. Analogously, norms are easier to create and 
enforce in closed, relative to open, networks since actors can more readily coor-
dinate expectations and sanction norm violation. Taken together, network closure 
around a secondhand trust triad will heighten the potential for secondhand trust 
between a secondhand trustor and trustee.
Additionally, the potential for secondhand trust to emerge is likely to vary with 
the extent of network closure around a secondhand trust triad. Specifically, the 
degree of network closure around a secondhand trust triad can be partial, rather than 
complete. For instance, there would be partial network closure if Tim is connected 
to Don and Bob, but not Lisa (Figure 8.4). Even so, the force of social control in the 
form of reputation and norms would still exist and, therefore, heighten the pros-
pects for secondhand trust, albeit less intensely than in the case of complete closure. 
The effect of partial closure is particularly interesting given that secondhand trust is 
amplified even though the third party (Tim) is not directly connected to the trus-
tor (Lisa). Likewise, in the situation where partial network closure exists around the 
trustor rather than the trustee, if for instance Tim is connected to Lisa and Don, but 
not Bob, the potential for secondhand trust to emerge is heightened. Lastly, as the 
number of mutual third parties to whom the members of a secondhand trust triad 
are connected increases, the prospects for secondhand trust are further amplified.
To summarize, secondhand trust is based on the transitivity of trust flowing 
through third-party intermediaries who connect two actors indirectly. A key proxy 
for trust transitivity is the open triad. The propensity for secondhand trust also 
increases with the strength of ties connecting the trustor and the trustee to the 
intermediary, increases with network closure, and decreases with social distance.
Prototrust
Like secondhand trust, we see prototrust as a property of social structure (i.e., 
beyond the dyad). However, unlike secondhand trust, we see prototrust as a 
social-structural property that may systematically vary across dyads within the 
same network. Analogous to secondhand trust, prototrust is a form of trust that 
occurs among actors in a network who are not directly connected to each other. 
Prototrust differs from secondhand trust, however, in that an indirect connection 
(i.e., through an advisor) is not a defining feature of this form of trust. Rather, pro-
totrust refers to the latent potential for confident positive expectations to emerge 
between two actors who are neither directly nor indirectly connected. Prototrust 
also differs from secondhand trust in that prototrust primarily occurs in affiliation 
networks, which involve joint participation or membership in collectivities, such 
as the case of the alumni association above, as well as other examples like social 
groups, clubs, and professional associations. Within affiliation networks, subgroups 
– such as activities, events, committees, organizations, and the like – exist, where 
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members interact more intensively (Faust, 1997). Additionally, members may have 
multiple, overlapping subgroup memberships (e.g., two members participating in 
the same social activities, and events, and committees), in which interaction inten-
sity increases even more. Thus, affiliation networks are often nested structures of 
primary membership in the bounded social system and secondary memberships 
on committees, events, and other subgroups.
Prototrust is based on (1) taken-for-granted, background assumptions about 
what constitutes trustworthy behavior in the context of an affiliation network and 
(2) the capacity of the network to curate and match members with compatible 
interests. Basic assumptions about the expected behavior of other members of the 
affiliation network in pursuit of shared goals are the genesis of prototrust. In the 
absence of such assumptions, individuals may still affiliate within a network, but 
the potential for prototrust is limited due to uncertainty about expected behav-
iors. For instance, in the case of the alumni association, there is a strong belief 
in giving back and helping other alumni whenever possible. New members are 
tacitly socialized by both the alumni association and existing members. Through 
events and other activities organized by the association, new members have a 
chance to see other alumni engaging in expected behaviors. Similarly, becoming a 
member of an organized crime syndicate entails clear understanding and accept-
ance of the behavioral rules of involvement in crime, solidarity, and omertà, i.e., 
code of silence (Gambetta, 1993). The clearer the rules and the more the rules 
circumscribe behaviors, even if they are informal or tacit, the less the uncertainty 
and the greater the potential for prototrust.
While necessary, background assumptions by themselves are not sufficient to 
initiate prototrust. In addition, members of affiliation networks are more likely to 
realize prototrust to the extent that the network facilitates the discovery of and con-
nection with other members with whom their goals are aligned. The curating and 
matching of members can occur in a number of different ways but is often enabled 
by a network architect (McEvily & Zaheer, 2004). The primary activities performed 
by a network architect include the initial design of the network and recruitment of 
members, as well as the ongoing evolution of the network. In particular, the rules 
of affiliation and rules of engagement (e.g., participation, contributions, and value 
creation), determine the extent to which prototrust may arise. Rules of affiliation 
encompass both the principles, conventions, and expectations that govern attract-
ing members to join the network and govern the inclusion of members into the 
network. Rules of engagement circumscribe the manner in which members may, 
and may not, interact with one other and the mechanisms of social control (e.g., 
sanctioning, ostracism, expulsion, etc.) that the members may exercise.
Drawing on network theory, we now articulate the mechanisms, indicators, 
and contingencies of prototrust (see Table 8.2). As we explain in detail below, 
prototrust is based on the mechanism of social prospecting. The primary indicator 
for prototrust is assortativity. Key contingencies of prototrust include governance 
veracity, network closure, and identity authenticity.
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Mechanism
The inclination to connect with a stranger in an affiliation network is based on 
heuristic processes (Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2011; McEvily, 2011; Uzzi, 1997) in 
which an actor’s background assumptions about, and the perceived quality of, the 
prospective match are fitted together in order draw an inference about the value 
of connecting with the prospective match. We refer to this class of social judg-
ments as “social prospecting.” Returning to the example of the alumni association, 
prototrust exists between alumni by virtue of the school attracting and selecting 
students who share common interests (career advancement, professional develop-
ment, helping others, etc.) and shared social experiences (e.g., work, education, 
extra-curricular, etc.). Members of the alumni association are open to connecting 
with each other to the extent that the association has attracted like-minded indi-
viduals who accept, internalize, and reinforce a shared set of norms, expectations, 
and codes of conduct for appropriate behavior. These normative expectations are 
driven in part by shared social experience and in part by the alumni association’s 
network governance.
Indicators
Prototrust at the network level is indicated by assortativity, which is defined as 
the tendency for actors in a network to preferentially connect with similar oth-
ers (Newman, 2002). For instance, in the case of the alumni association, two 
individuals may connect based on their common interests in promoting gender 
equity and diversity in their respective organizations. Likewise, in the case eToro, 
two traders may connect on the basis of their shared interest in socially responsible 
investing. The specific form of similarity upon which assortativity is based var-
ies depending on the nature of the context (social, professional, organizational). 
At the same time, matching may occur preferentially such that dissimilar actors 
connect, which is known as disassortativity (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005; Watts, 2004). 
For instance, in the case of the alumni association, two individuals with different 
years of work experience may connect to form a mentorship relationship. In the 
case of prototrust, both assortativity and disassortativity are operative. Assortativity 
underlying prototrust is based on factors such as common interests, while disas-
sortativity could be based on factors such as status asymmetry. The potential for 
(dis)assortativity in a network is a function of the extent to which the network 
has tightly defined and enforced rules of affiliation and rules of engagement. Put 
another way, to the extent that the network is better able to curate and match 
members with compatible interests, the greater the assortative matching success 
of social prospecting among members. Likewise, to the extent that the network 
is better able to reveal underlying differences in quality that are relevant to the 
formation of a status hierarchy (Ertug & Castellucci, 2013; Podolny, 1993), the 
greater the disassortative matching success of social prospecting among members.
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Prototrust at the dyad level is indicated by the capacity of the network to dif-
ferentiate members both horizontally (i.e., similar interests) and vertically (i.e., 
status). Differentiation, both horizontally and vertically, in a network refers to the 
distribution of attributes among members such that differentiation is lower when 
attributes are highly concentrated, and differentiation is higher when attributes 
are highly dispersed across members. Horizontal network differentiation clarifies 
the strength and overlap of interests shared by some, but not all, members. One 
common instantiation of horizontal differentiation in affiliation networks is via 
subgroups that enable, concentrate, and accelerate the flow of valued resources 
among members who share similar interests. Subgroups form organically by 
member initiation and may be enabled by structures put in place by the network 
architect. For instance, an organic member-initiated group indicative of horizon-
tal differentiation might include industry-based, topic-based, or regional activities 
initiated by alumni. Similarly, horizontal differentiation in the alumni association 
may form cohort-based or interest-based (e.g., finance, consulting, marketing) 
groups at events such as reunions to help alumni meet and interact with others 
who share some commonality. Critically, both of these are examples of informal 
groups in the sense that members freely choose to join (or not) the group regard-
less of whether the group is initiated by the members or by the network architect.
Another way that horizontal differentiation occurs in affiliation networks is 
by referral and recommendation algorithms that are intentionally designed by the 
network architect. Such algorithmic processes are pervasive in online networking 
platforms (e.g., LinkedIn, ResearchGate, Match .c om) of many forms. As these 
examples suggest, formal structures, systems, and rules create the context within 
which individuals choose whether or not to affiliate with other members. While 
the structures, systems, and rules are formally designed and maintained by the 
network architect, the choice to affiliate is informal in the sense that rather than 
being assigned to interact, individuals choose to do so.
Vertical network differentiation in terms of status clarifies the perceived differ-
ences in quality among members and in social judgments about members inde-
pendent of their innate quality. Status in affiliation networks often takes the form 
of rankings, recognition, and reviews. For instance, vertical differentiation is mani-
fested in eToro (the case of social trading discussed earlier) through compilation 
and display of information on highly copied traders for all to see, which proxy for 
not only innate quality but also the aggregate social judgments of other members. 
Such rankings are intentionally devised and highlighted by the network architect 
in an effort to reduce uncertainty and promote the potential for relationship 
initiation.
Contingencies
At both the network and dyadic levels, prototrust is amplified (or dampened) 
by the perceived reliability or veracity of network governance, the visibility of 
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the network configuration, and the extent to which members can discriminate 
between each other on the basis of authentic identities.
Governance veracity. By veracity, we mean the extent to which members accept 
that the network applies the rules of affiliation and rules of engagement consist-
ently and rigorously, such that members who share common interests and back-
ground assumptions with the existing members are selected into the network, 
while prospective members who do not share interests and background assump-
tions are screened out. Governance veracity is also relevant for allowing members 
to make better matches with other members who share the same interests through 
the creation of subgroups and algorithms. To be clear, we are not claiming that 
there is a change in the formality of the network structure due to the rules. The 
rules are formal in the sense that they are originated by the network architect, but 
the rules are more accurately understood as a framework for interaction, within 
which members decide for themselves whether or not to informally interact with 
certain other members.
Network closure. Prototrust is also enhanced to the extent that the architect of 
the network provides information enabling members to view the network and 
differentiate each other in terms of status. In the context of affiliation networks, 
the social structure in which members are embedded is a further signal that can 
enhance prototrust. For instance, consider a new member of eToro. The actual 
structure of copy trading ties that she observes, which the architect makes trans-
parent to all the members, influences prototrust in other members. The level of 
network closure she observers around others, particularly other high-status mem-
bers, amplifies the potential for trust.
Identity authenticity. Finally, the greater the extent to which members perceive 
others as authentic in their projected personas, the more the prototrust. Networks 
“confer social identity through the segmentation of social space into clusters and 
positions populated by actors who share common social characteristics and who 
are, therefore, social referents for each other” (Ibarra, Kilduff, & Tsai, 2005, p. 362). 
The degree of congruence, or lack thereof, between a member’s social identity 
and self-projected identity determines the authenticity of identity and, respec-
tively, amplifies or attenuates the potential for prototrust. For instance, in eToro 
members are allowed to choose nicknames and avatars to represent themselves or 
to use their actual names and photographs. The latter are more likely to receive 
copy-trading ties since they are seen as more authentic.
Effects of Network Trust
Taken together, the logics of secondhand trust and prototrust provide a wide 
variety of promising avenues for further research. A key priority for advancing 
the research agenda on network trust is exploring the extent to which, and ways 
in which, secondhand trust and prototrust matter for valued outcomes in and 
between organizations.
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Risk-Taking Outside of Relationships
While in traditional models of relational trust, risks are concentrated at the level 
of the dyad, in network trust, risks are distributed and shared across larger systems 
of relationships. In this sense, network trust is ‘in the air’ and becomes a resource 
that is shared beyond just the two members of a dyad to other members of the 
network in close proximity, and in the case of prototrust, extending throughout 
the network to members who are disconnected from one another. As a conse-
quence, the assessment of the risks associated with placing trust is based not on 
the properties of the dyad, but rather on the features of network structure and 
governance. A key implication of theorizing trust from a network perspective is 
that the concepts of secondhand trust and prototrust advance our understanding 
of the micro–macro links as posited by Coleman (1990).
In his ‘bathtub’ model Coleman displays the links between the micro and macro 
levels of social systems (see Figure 8.5). Arrow A represents the effect of system-
level features, in our case structural features of the network such as open relational 
trust triads and (dis)assortativity, on a system-level outcome, which is network 
trust. Arrow B shows how the system-level conditions the individual-level by 
means of mechanisms such as transitivity of relational trust for secondhand trust 
and social prospecting for prototrust. These mechanisms, in turn, influence gener-
alized positive expectations about the motives, intentions, and behaviors between 
individuals at the micro level. Arrow C conveys the individual-level actions that 
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FIGURE 8.5  Macro–micro links of network trust.
Adapted from Source: Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press.
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taking outside of direct relationships. Lastly, arrow D indicates the extent to which 
the individual-level actions aggregate to produce macro-level outcomes. In our 
case, while the aggregation generated by secondhand trust is the contagion of trust 
among network members, the aggregation created by prototrust is the engage-
ment of individuals with the collective community in the form of citizenship, 
participation, cohesion, and solidarity. Taken together, our theory also extends 
to the percolation of trust between macro and micro levels of social systems in a 
way that identifies and details the mechanisms, actions, and links that underlie the 
notion of trust being ‘in the air.’
Substitute for Relational Trust
From a collective perspective, then, networks that are able to enhance secondhand 
trust and prototrust are capable of yielding trust-like advantages on a large, dis-
tributed scale. For example, the costs associated with developing relational trust at 
the micro level are not only time-consuming and high but also concentrated in 
socially proximate relationships. In contrast, the production of trust in networks 
occurs at a relatively larger scale. Imagine a team of 20 people who, in order to 
engage in joint activities, have to develop relational trust with every other mem-
ber of the team. The investment in terms of the number of relational trust ties to 
be activated is n(n–1)/2, or 190, assuming trust is reciprocal. By comparison, sup-
pose the same group of 20 people are at a maximum distance from each other of 
two ties. By virtue of secondhand trust, the number of relational trust ties needed 
is reduced to as little as 19 (with a hub and spoke structure). The efficiency gains 
are achieved by substituting direct relational trust ties (171 in the example above) 
with secondhand trust ties (19 ties), which involve considerably lower investment 
than relational trust. Clearly, the efficiency gains are considerable; an order of 
magnitude lower for secondhand trust. At the same time, a question arises as to 
whether such efficiency of secondhand trust also translates into comparable effec-
tiveness relative to relational trust. Further, for a team of 20 people that embodies 
the conditions for prototrust, the emergence of trust is potentially automatic, 
or swift, by virtue of the co-affiliation network ties. While secondhand trust is 
a substitute, prototrust is an enabler, precursor, or “lubricant” (Arrow, 1974) for 
relational trust. Both secondhand trust and prototrust establish the notion that risk 
taking in network settings is not solely based on direct relational ties.
Complement to Relational Trust
In addition to acting as a substitute for relational trust, network trust may also 
serve as a complement. Returning to the tenure letter case (Figure 8.1), the result 
of Lisa’s secondhand trust in Bob may spill over to Lisa’s direct relational trust 
with Don and Don’s direct relational trust with Bob. For instance, if Lisa’s trust in 
Bob’s private information is well-placed, Lisa’s relational trust in Don is further 
enhanced. In this way, secondhand trust begets relational trust. At the same time, 
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when Lisa’s secondhand trust is misplaced, her relational trust in Don is compro-
mised. Here, misplaced secondhand trust corrodes relational trust, and the same 
sorts of spillovers of secondhand trust onto relational trust apply to the relational 
trust between Bob and Don. Note that such spillover effects need not be sym-
metric. For instance, if Lisa lacked discretion in how she handled the private 
information from Bob via Don, both Don’s trust in Lisa and Bob’s trust in Don 
would be compromised.
Positioning Network Trust
As we argue in the preceding pages, network trust is not relational trust, which 
requires firsthand knowledge or experience. At the same time, network trust is 
related to, although distinct from, other trust constructs including presumptive, 
swift, institutional, and generalized trust, which we discuss below.
Network trust is akin to presumptive trust (Kramer, 2010) in the sense that 
it involves generalized positive expectations in the context of a collective. 
Importantly, however, network trust differs from presumptive trust in terms of 
the unit of analysis. For presumptive trust, the unit of analysis is the average, or 
stereotypical, member of the collective as perceived by the trustor, which then 
provides the content for presumptive trust in “the collective as a whole” (Kramer 
& Lewicki, 2010, p. 259). In contrast, the unit of analysis for network trust is the 
social structural position of members in the network. Thus, while presumptive 
trust implies a set of diffuse expectations in an entire collectivity, network trust 
is enabled and shaped by features of networks and is directed toward specific 
members of the network. Although presumptive trust may extend to “individuals 
who are considered ingroup members,” it is based on the “generic features of all 
the members of that collective” (p. 259). Unlike such a diffuse conceptualiza-
tion, network trust differentiates among the members of a collective and is best 
understood as being an embedded form of trust that percolates among members 
to differing degrees. That is, our concept of network trust identifies the process 
and flow of trust based on the features of a network and the relative positioning 
of members in the network.
Network trust is also similar to, but different from, swift trust. Swift trust refers 
to the trust that forms in the context of temporary systems, characterized by high 
interdependence, high risk, and complex tasks among individuals who typically 
have never worked together in the past and have no expectation of working 
together again in the future. As Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer (1996) explain, 
Trust (or distrust) in temporary systems can develop swiftly because the 
expectations that are invoked most quickly tend to be general, task-based, 
plausible, easy to confirm, and stable, all of which implies the care of valu-
able things can be entrusted to those who seem to fit these institution-
driven categories.
(1996, p. 175) 
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Whereas swift trust is grounded in institution-driven categories that allow roles to 
be invoked instantly, network trust is based on social structures that facilitate the 
flow of trust and provide the conditions for relational trust to potentially emerge.
Further, network trust is not institutional trust – i.e., it is not “the safety one 
feels about a situation because of guarantees, safety nets, or structures” (McKnight 
et al., 1998). With respect to secondhand trust, it is not the effect of safeguards 
in shaping context that engenders trust, but rather the effect of actors and the 
configuration of actors that account for trust. More precisely, secondhand trust 
is based on the informal norms, expectations, values, and reputations that are 
widely held among a bounded set of actors. In terms of prototrust, it is the signals 
of assortativity that differentiate it from institutional trust. At the institutional 
level, affiliation is highly diffuse and extends to broad categories of membership 
(e.g., the nation-state, religion, etc.). For prototrust, network affiliation is crucial 
because it is one of the key bases upon which assortativity occurs. Moreover, 
relative to institutional trust, the signals of assortativity underlying prototrust are 
clearer and more informative for the creation of ties and the potential to realize 
relational trust. Thus, while institutional regulations, guarantees, and laws facili-
tate, for example, banking transactions by mitigating downside risks, those safe-
guards are not informative for differentiating among prospective transactors (e.g., 
banks). In contrast, prototrust is precisely the latent potential for confident posi-
tive expectations to emerge due to the assortativity of a network.
Lastly, network trust is not generalized trust, which is defined as a belief in the 
benevolence in human nature in general. Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994, p. 139) 
call this type of trust “general trust,” as it reflects “a belief in the benevolence of 
human nature in general.” Generalized trust is most frequently assessed at the 
societal level, using survey items such as “Generally speaking would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with peo-
ple?” Network trust applies within the boundary of the network and is based on 
expectations about members of the network.
Discussion and Conclusion
Scholarly understanding of trust is concentrated at two extremes. On the one 
hand, trust is considered inherently personal in terms of the relational features of 
direct interactions. On the other hand, trust is treated as impersonal in terms of 
the institutional properties safeguarding exchange. The gulf between these poles 
remains conceptually bereft. Into this void, we propose a class of trust that is situ-
ated in the enduring pattern of social connections among actors – network trust. 
Given the widespread prevalence of social networks in and between organiza-
tions, it behooves us to understand the distinctive forms of trust to which net-
works give rise.
Network trust is especially relevant in the organizational context where get-
ting things done routinely requires relying on others with whom there is no direct 
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connection (Krackhardt & Hansen, 1993) and where formal roles and structures 
do not explicitly specify how all decisions and actions are to be organized and 
coordinated (McEvily et al., 2014). As a result, informal arrangements for achiev-
ing organizational goals and outcomes emerge and are put in place based on 
socially devised understandings. At the same time, it is important to recognize that 
the informal side of organizations need not necessarily enable trust and at times 
may even undermine it or engender distrust due to, for instance, inter-depart-
mental skullduggery, organizational politics, opportunistic behavior, and the like. 
Thus, organizations are a prime arena for examining network trust and distrust 
given the inherent interdependencies that exist and the discretion that individuals 
have, to varying degrees, to support the activities and role-responsibilities of their 
co-workers.
We see a number of exciting implications for organizational scholars from 
examining trust through the lens of the network forms that we have conceptual-
ized. The first-order implication of embracing network trust is to revisit the basic 
premise of the genesis and realization of trust. Thus far, scholarly understanding 
of trust has been heavily based on the psychological view of trust as personal 
and the sociological view of trust as impersonal. We maintain that there is also a 
distinct network view of trust that is multi-level and recognizes both structure (in 
terms of patterns of connections) and behavior (in terms of the actions taken by 
individuals under constraints). Viewed this way, network trust bridges a multi-level 
space between the micro and the macro, between the personal and impersonal, 
between the psychological and sociological. Network trust is a phenomenon in 
and of itself. Thus, while network trust could be considered in relation to other 
forms of trust (e.g., as a substitute or complement), the prime implication is to 
treat network trust as a novel form and consider the unique understandings that 
it permits. Indeed, we see a wide range of promising avenues for network trust 
to enrich scholarly understanding. Three areas in particular are ripe for discovery.
From Stocks to Flows
Most organizational research on trust is principally concerned with explaining 
the level of trust within a relationship. In addition to informing our understanding 
of such ‘stocks,’ network trust introduces the potential to consider how trust ebbs 
and flows through a network. By virtue of the structural features of a network, 
trust and distrust have the potential to spread, as do trends, fads, gossip, and good 
ideas. Importantly, the ‘contagion’ of trust does not just happen on its own, but 
rather is agentic in the sense that it is intentionally passed along and accepted 
when individuals pursue interests that require them to rely on strangers for valued 
resources. At the same, network trust can be latent to the extent that it resides in 
network structures that can lie dormant for an extended period until triggered by 
a critical event. When network trust is activated at a large scale, it has the potential 
to fuel social movements for collective action. For instance, when a manager is 
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promoting a new initiative, program, or product that requires the buy-in and sup-
port of colleagues from across the organization who are not directly connected to 
the manager, those colleagues typically draw on the reservoir of network trust to 
create a well-spring of support, apathy, or resistance toward the initiative.
From Emergent to Designed
Part of the allure of trust is its potential to enable actions that would be exceed-
ingly costly or difficult to achieve in its absence. Analogous to conventional forms 
of capital in economic models (e.g., human, financial, physical), trust has been 
characterized as a type of social capital with similar value-generating properties 
(Coleman, 1988). As a factor of production, scholars have also considered the 
modes of production by which trust is constructed and reconstituted (Zucker, 
1986a). Like the broader organizational literature, trust production modes are 
conceptualized in terms of personal (i.e., character-based and exchange pro-
cesses–based) and impersonal (institutional-based) mechanisms. Alongside these 
modes, we maintain that informal networks of connections also create trust, albeit 
via a distinct production function. In some cases, the production of trust is emer-
gent and automatic as a consequence of common shared experiences. In other 
instances, the production of trust in networks is more intentional and by design 
(Hurley, Gillespie, Ferrin, & Dietz, 2013). And in still other situations, both the 
emergent and intentional combine.
Consider again the example of alumni networks. By virtue of graduating from 
the same educational institution, two alumni are members of a common affiliation 
network and to the extent that they are indirectly connected by other alumni, they 
may experience secondhand trust. At the same time, even if they are not indirectly 
connected, the fact that they belong to a community with shared values and identity 
creates the potential for prototrust. Further, a number of educational institutions 
organize reunions, events, and other activities with the express intent of creating 
opportunities for alumni to meet, reconnect, and interact. In this way, the alumni 
network strengthens the potential for trust by reinforcing the sense of shared iden-
tity and social norms and enhances the potential for network closure. Here, govern-
ance veracity is less salient given the alumni’s prior socialization into the network 
by virtue of being selected into and matriculating from the educational institution.
The production of trust by networks is of course not limited to the alumni 
of educational institutions, but extends to shared prior organizational affiliations 
(e.g., McKinsey, GE, State Department). It is important to note that for each of 
these examples, the presence of an affiliation network is the minimum required 
necessary condition for prototrust. In addition, the production of prototrust for 
a given type of affiliation network (e.g., MBA alumni networks) varies depend-
ing on the intrinsic prestige of the institution as well as the design of the affili-
ation network in terms of creating opportunities for effective social prospecting 
through assortativity (i.e., status-based and interest-based matches).
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From Dyads to Networks
The past three decades of organizational scholarship on trust has laid a critical foun-
dation for understanding the nature of trust in and between organizations – how the 
willingness to be vulnerable has been investigated as a relational property between 
a pair of directly connected actors. The bulk of trust theory has been predicated 
on the dyadic level. Our understanding of the antecedents, formation, duration, 
dissolution, repair, concomitants, (a)symmetry, intensity, and outcomes, among oth-
ers facets, have as their locus the dyad. How these dyadic elements link to macro-
level organizational dynamics remains a critical but relatively less studied aspect of 
scholarship. We argue that network forms of trust provide a bridge to discovering 
the contextual underpinnings of trust. The network perspective presents the oppor-
tunity to consider the ways in which system-level features influence trust beyond 
the micro-dyadic level to also encompass more network-level elements such as the 
governance and design of social systems to generate and deploy trust.
Taken together, the network forms of trust we have proposed lay the foun-
dation for moving from stocks to flows, from emergent to designed, and from 
dyadic to network. In so doing, we aim to promote a richer, deeper, and enhanced 
understanding of the nature of trust in organizational settings.
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